Political Motives in the Border Dispute

  • W. F. Van Eekelen


In the years immediately after gaining power the new Chinese regime grossly overrated the military strength of the communist bloc. With regard to the United States this self-confidence resulted in Chines intervention in the Korean war. In respect of neutralism Peking, like Russia at that time, saw the world divided into two camps which left no room for a third. It assumed too easily that the emerging nations could be swayed into opposing the West by Chinese verbal support for their anti-colonial struggle. After a stalemate had been reached in Korea the Chinese communists adopted a cautious attitude towards the Americans and, realising the importance of maintaining a buffer zone around China as long as the non-aligned could not yet be included in the communist orbit, attempted to gain admission to the Afro-Asian community. At Bandung the Chinese Prime Minister scored a major diplomatic success with his persuasive demonstration of friendly intentions. The pendulum was not long, however, in swinging back to a more radical outlook, coinciding with the appearance of a group of men devoted to extremist internal policies which produced the Great Leap Forward. In foreign affairs this change may have been a result of frustration as no tangible result had yet accrued from the soft approach.


Socialist Country Territorial Dispute Political Motive Peaceful Coexistence Chinese Foreign Policy 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1967

Authors and Affiliations

  • W. F. Van Eekelen

There are no affiliations available

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