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The Border Dispute with China

  • W. F. Van Eekelen

Abstract

The Sino-Indian border incidents which occurred during the summer of 1959 led to the publication of a series of White Papers containing the official correspondence between the two countries. Not only did they reveal that Chinese intrusions into the north-eastern corner of Ladakh had been discovered prior to July, 19582 and the construction of a motor road as part of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway three months later,3 but they also contained an exchange of notes concerning the disputed grazing grounds of Bara Hoti, in which each side kept referring to the principles of Panchsheel from July, 1954 onwards. Three notes are dated shortly after Chou En-lai’s visit to New Delhi, but prior to the Bandung Conference.4 The Chinese maintained that Indian troops had crossed the border into the Tibet region of China, which was “not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly coexistence between China and India, and the spirit of the joint communiqué issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India.” The Indian reply stated that on the contrary Tibetan officials had tried to cross the border without proper documents and it literally returned the Chinese phrase just quoted. Later the terminology became considerably harsher.

Keywords

Prime Minister White Paper Eastern Sector External Affair Chinese Side 
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  • W. F. Van Eekelen

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