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Abstract

In the two and a half years which have passed since the manuscript for this book was terminated, two major events occurred: firstly the armed clash between India and Pakistan, which was settled with Soviet mediation while China strongly supported the Pakistani position; and secondly, the explosion of nuclear devices by China.1 The situation on the Sino-Indian border had previously remained relatively quiet and the exchange of notes between the two countries dealt mainly with mutual accusations concerning minor intrusions and violation of air space. The Sikkim-border, the only stretch of the boundary which had been clearly described in a treaty, gave rise to some concern in August 1964 when India protested against a Chinese intrusion.1a It was this sector which Peking used for an ultimatum during the fighting: in Kashmir.

Keywords

Foreign Minister American Political Science Review Bilateral Agreement Minor Intrusion Nuclear Device 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    India reacted by accusing China of a reversal of her stand at the Bandung conference, which had appealed for a suspension of nuclear experiments. White Paper XI, p. 80.Google Scholar
  2. 1.
    a Ibidem, p. 24.Google Scholar
  3. 2.
    Documents on China’s ultimatum to India, p. 8.Google Scholar
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    Ibidem, p. 37. “Incidents on the Sikkim border continued during November and Decern” ber and may have been intended to stiffen Pakistan’s determination. The Tashkent a-greement of January 10, 1966, provided for withdrawal of armed personnel to positions held on August 5, the date of the despatch of the raiders. The restoration of the status quo was welcomed by India, but its relevance as a precedent for the Sino-Indian border is small as Peking takes the view that its unilateral withdrawal went as far as the “line of actual control.”Google Scholar
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    Verbal statement communicated by A. Rose to Ivan Chen on March, 1914. I. O. File 464, P. 1215.Google Scholar
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    McMahon’s Final Memorandum, P. 536, p. 11 reads: „This secures to us a natural watershed frontier, access to the shortest trade route into Tibet, and control of the monastery of Tawang which has blocked the trade by this route in the past by undue exaction and oppression.“Google Scholar
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    Lamb makes a similar statement, op. cit., p. 526.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1967

Authors and Affiliations

  • W. F. Van Eekelen

There are no affiliations available

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