All I was concerned to do in Chapter 1 was to point out that the use of linguistic analysis as a mode of philosophical investigation has meant an inevitable return to metaphysical problems. In this chapter I propose to examine the relation between metaphysics and language. In a sense much of what I will say in this chapter has been implied in the preceding one. But I want to emphasize certain points and to clarify some others before I undertake to define what can be meant by ‘metaphysics’.
KeywordsSimple Object Categorial Feature Ordinary Language Negative Instance Empirical Statement
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