Like Russell in his lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, I want to begin this part of my discussion with what is perfectly obvious and undeniable. I shall therefore make the assertion that there are events. Now the word ‘event’ whose referent is to be the event is a basic term in what I am to say and so in a sense no definition of it can be given. Its referent can be recognized, experienced, intuited and such like, but the word itself cannot be defined except ostensively. I do not wish to make the distinction that Russell does in Logical Atomism between simples and complex facts because our experience of whatever kind is never of what Russell calls facts but of events. Of course Russell defines a “fact” as that which makes a proposition true or false but in a sense this definition is not correct. Actually it is not the “fact” that makes the proposition true but our experience of it. This is not said in any facetious sense but sincerely.
KeywordsAtomic Proposition False Statement Nominative Case Open Sentence Actual Occasion
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- 1.G. Frege, “Function and Concept” in Translation from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege Peter Geach and Max Black (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952 ), pp. 21 ff.Google Scholar