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Behavioral Dynamics under Climate Change Dilemmas

  • Francisco C. SantosEmail author
  • Jorge M. Pacheco
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Part of the The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective book series (PSEP, volume 4)

Abstract

Preventing global warming is a public good requiring overall cooperation. Contributions will depend on the risk of future losses, which plays a key role in decision-making. Here, we discuss a theoretical model grounded on game theory and large-scale population dynamics. We show how decisions within small groups under high risk and stringent requirements toward success significantly raise the chances of coordinating to save the planet’s climate, thus escaping the tragedy of the commons. In addition, our model predicts that, if one takes into consideration that groups of different sizes will be interwoven in complex networks of contacts, the chances for global coordination into an overall cooperating state are further enhanced.

Keywords

Replicator Dynamic Public Good Game Evolutionary Game Theory International Environmental Agreement World Summit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.GAIPS/INESC-ID, IST TagusparquePorto SalvoPortugal
  2. 2.Departamento de Matemática e AplicaçõesUniversidade do MinhoBragaPortugal

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