Concluding Remarks

  • Iris HungerEmail author
  • Lisa D. Rotz
  • Goran Belojevic
  • Vladan Radosavljevic
Conference paper
Part of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology book series (NAPSA)


The case studies collected in this book illustrate the considerable ­differences in bioterrorism threat perception, levels of biopreparedness, and views on how to balance general public health efforts and biopreparedness measures. While investing too little in biopreparedness leaves countries ill-equipped for a potential disaster, spending too much might create a threat in itself, for example, by redirecting resources away from dealing with everyday health threats. Countries, regardless of perceived threat or economic capacity, should aim to develop and maintain a public health system capable of a well-planned, well-rehearsed, and rapidly executed response to natural health emergencies. Such a system will diminish the consequences of both a naturally occurring health emergency and a bioterrorist attack, should it occur.


Public Health System Emergency Preparedness Lassa Fever Disease Surveillance System International Health Regulation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Iris Hunger
    • 1
    Email author
  • Lisa D. Rotz
    • 2
  • Goran Belojevic
    • 3
  • Vladan Radosavljevic
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace ResearchUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany
  2. 2.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)AtlantaUSA
  3. 3.Institute of Hygiene and Medical Ecology, Faculty of MedicineUniversity of BelgradeBelgradeSerbia
  4. 4.Military AcademyUniversity of DefenceBelgradeSerbia
  5. 5.Medical Corps HeadquartersArmy of SerbiaBelgradeSerbia

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