Modeling a small agent society based on social choice logic programming

  • Kenryo Indo
Conference paper
Part of the Agent-Based Social Systems book series (ABSS, volume 6)


This paper reports a computational modeling toolkit, with several non-trivial applications, for collective decision making in a small artificial society of three alternatives, and two, three agents, or possibly of larger scale models. Based on the standard axioms in voting and social choice, this modeling makes the axiomatic approaches in social sciences computationally verifiable and intellectually tangible by means of the logic programming.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenryo Indo
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management, Faculty of EconomicsKanto-Gakuen UniversityOta-si, Gumma-kenJapan

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