Microfoundations of Evolutionary Economics

  • Yoshinori Shiozawa
  • Masashi Morioka
  • Kazuhisa Taniguchi
Part of the Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science book series (EESCS, volume 15)


An evolutionary point of view is the best way to understand the economy and its development. This is the central dogma of evolutionary economics. In this chapter on the foundations of evolutionary economics, we discuss (1) why this dogma is supportable, (2) why most of economic entities evolve, (3) what are the defects of standard (or neoclassical) economic theories, and (4) ideas to reconstruct economics in an evolutionary way.

The main task of this chapter is to find the basic form of human behavior. Human being is an entity whose capability is strictly limited in (1) sight, (2) rationality, and (3) execution. How such an entity can effectively behave in a large economic system which is a network which extends worldwide. The question should be investigated from two sides. One is the structure of our behavior. We contend that all routine behavior is composed of C-D transformations or if-then rules. The other is the system characteristics which can be summarized by (1) stationarity, (2) loosely connectedness, and (3) ample margin of subsistence. Only in such a system, routine behavior is a powerful instrument of human knowledge. This two-sidedness requires the economic methodology to be reorganized from the micro-macro loop approach.


Bounded rationality Structure of the human behavior Micro-macro loop If-then rule C-D transformation Semiotics 



I express my special thanks to Robin Edward Jarvis, who helped me substantially in revising the earlier draft and choosing better terms and expressions. By pointing out many unclear sentences, he also forced me to make my ideas more clear. I express my special thanks to my co-authors, Kazuhisa Taniguchi and Masashi Morioka, who have continued my earlier, but failed attempt and succeeded in establishing the basic framework that permits us to analyze economy-wide quantity adjustment processes. Without the achievements of these two, I could not have advanced firmly into process analysis. The concept of micro-macro loop was a byproduct of our co-joint research. I also thank Tetsuro Nakaoka and the late Tamito Yoshida, to whose ideas I owe much in formulating the basic forms of human behavior.


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yoshinori Shiozawa
    • 1
  • Masashi Morioka
    • 2
  • Kazuhisa Taniguchi
    • 3
  1. 1.Osaka City UniversityOsakaJapan
  2. 2.College of International RelationsRitsumeikan UniversityKyotoJapan
  3. 3.Faculty of EconomicsKindai UniversityOsakaJapan

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