Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy

  • Kiichiro YagiEmail author
Part of the Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science book series (EESCS, volume 20)


Adam Smith’s concept of division of labor is an inexhaustible fountain for evolutionary ideas in economics. It not only enhances productivity and generates diversity but also gives birth to the peculiar institution of money and capital. Under capitalism, the transaction between employer and employee reflects the relationship between the class of capitalists and that of workers. Its result depends on the strategies and resources of both sides. However, each class is not always united; the distribution of the members within each class must be considered. This chapter further discusses collective action in the form of “voice,” along with its relationships to another type of action, “exit.” In several cases, “voice” and “exit” are incorporated into the institution as a tool of “governance.”


Division of labor Emergence of money and capital Emergence of institutions Relations between classes Voice and exit 


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© Springer Japan KK, part of Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Setsunan UniversityNeyagawaJapan

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