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Pläne, Entscheidungen und Heuristiken

  • Andreas Nachbagauer
  • Iris Schirl-Böck
  • Edgar Weiss
Chapter
  • 95 Downloads

Zusammenfassung

Die inhaltliche Dimension (Sachdimension) definiert diejenigen Themen, zu denen sinnvolle Kommunikationen und Entscheidungen in einer Organisation möglich sind. In dieser Dimension sind Pläne und Entscheidungsprogramme die zentralen Bausteine für die Organisationsstruktur. Ziele, Strategien, Leitbilder, Regeln und Richtlinien sowie Statuten und Planungsdokumente stellen sicher, dass in einer Organisation nicht über alles kommuniziert und entschieden werden kann und muss. Diskutiert werden Finalprogramme, die sich an bestimmten Outputs ausrichten, und Konditionalprogramme, die für bestimmte Inputs Spielräume begrenzen. Der Ausführung von Entscheidungsprogrammen vorgeschaltet ist die Planung. Planung ist als Versuch zu werten, Erwartungen über künftige Systemzustände zu formulieren und damit zu festzulegen, wie mit zukünftigen Alternativen zu verfahren ist.

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© Springer-Verlag GmbH Deutschland, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andreas Nachbagauer
    • 1
  • Iris Schirl-Böck
    • 1
  • Edgar Weiss
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachhochschule des BFI Wien GmbHWienÖsterreich

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