Robustness of the Government and the Parliament, and Legislative Procedures in Europe

  • Chiara De Micheli
  • Vito FragnelliEmail author
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11290)


In a previous paper (see [3]), we analyzed the procedures of the Italian Constitution, focussing on their strength correlating it with the strength of the government and of the Parliament, measured through two parameters, the governability and the fragmentation. Here, we extend the analysis to other European democracies: United Kingdom, France, and Spain.


Legislative procedures Governability Fragmentation Robustness 



The authors gratefully acknowledge two anonymous referees for their useful comments and detailed remarks, and the participants to the workshop “Quantitative methods of group decision making” held at the Wroclaw School of Banking in November 2017 for useful discussions.


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© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Sciences, Communication Sciences and Engineering of InformationUniversity of SassariSassariItaly
  2. 2.Department of Science and Innovative TechnologiesUniversity of Eastern PiedmontAlessandriaItaly

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