Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets

  • Britta Dorn
  • Dominikus Krüger
  • Patrick Scharpfenecker
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9470)

Abstract

We study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem (an external agent tries to prevent a disliked candidate from winning by bribery actions) in voting over combinatorial domains, where the set of candidates is the Cartesian product of several issues. This problem is related to the concept of the margin of victory of an election which constitutes a measure of robustness of the election outcome and plays an important role in the context of electronic voting. In our setting, voters have conditional preferences over assignments to these issues, modelled by CP-nets. We settle the complexity of all combinations of this problem based on distinctions of four voting rules, five cost schemes, three bribery actions, weighted and unweighted voters, as well as the negative and the non-negative scenario. We show that almost all of these cases are \(\mathcal {NP}\)-complete or \(\mathcal {NP}\)-hard for weighted votes while approximately half of the cases can be solved in polynomial time for unweighted votes.

Keywords

Computational social choice Voting Bribery CP-nets Destructive 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Britta Dorn
    • 1
  • Dominikus Krüger
    • 2
  • Patrick Scharpfenecker
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Faculty of ScienceUniversity of TübingenTübingenGermany
  2. 2.Institute of Theoretical Computer ScienceUlm UniversityUlmGermany

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