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Conceptions of Science

  • J. M. Ziman
Conference paper
Part of the Institut für Höhere Studien — Institute for Advanced Studies IHS-Studies book series (INHSIAS)

Abstract

In the past half century, science has moved from the periphery of social affairs into the centre. Public policies for research and development in basic science, and in a wide range of science-based technologies, are of perceptible weight in national and international politics. Technical experts with scientific qualifications have become major actors in public affairs. [1] Attitudes towards scientific innovations and their possible effects on the quality of life determine the fate of political parties and influence the direction of economic development in many countries. [2]

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References

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    I have not yet found a satisfactory analytical account of this subject, on which there is, of course, a vast bulk of primary material in the form of government reports and journalistic commentaries. Perhaps the main reason why such an account has not yet been written is that it would need these new conceptions of Science to make sense!Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. M. Ziman
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Social and Economic StudiesImperial College of Science and TechnologyGB-LondonUK

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