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Correlated Equilibria in Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games

  • Andrzej S. Nowak
Conference paper

Abstract

Nonzero-sum stochastic games play an increasing role in studying various dynamic economic models. In most mentioned applications it is assumed that the state spaces of the games are uncountable. For a broad discussion on these topics we refer the reader to [2], [3] and their references. The aim of this presentation is to report some correlated and/or Nash equilibrium theorems for a large class of nonzero-sum stochastic games with a continuum of states contained in [11], [12], and [13].

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrzej S. Nowak
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of MathematicsTechnical University of WrocławWrocławPoland

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