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Coordination Failure and Endogenous Timing

  • Sjaak Hurkens
Conference paper

Abstract

In game theoretic modelling there are generally two problems. The first the problem of leadership. In most models it is assumed either that all players act simultaneously or that the players act in an exogenously given order. In reality it is often the case that it is not clear whether there is a leader, and if so, who is the leader. Therefore I endogenize the timing decision.

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References

  1. Aumann R. and Sorin S. (1989). Cooperation and bounded recall. Games and economic behavior, 1, 5–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Kalai E. and Samet D. (1984). Persistent equilibria in strategic games. International journal of game theory, 13, 129–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sjaak Hurkens
    • 1
  1. 1.CentER, KUBTilburgNetherlands

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