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Controlled Communication Networks

  • V. Feltkamp
  • A. van den Nouweland
Conference paper

Abstract

In a cooperative TU (Transferable Utility) game (N, v) as modelled by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), N is a finite set of players, and the characteristic function v assigns to each subgroup of players a real number which is to be interpreted as the maximal gains this coalition can secure by cooperating.

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References

  1. •.
    Borm, P., Nouweland, A. van den, and Tijs, S.H. (1991). “Cooperation and communication restrictions: a survey”, in: ‘Economic Behaviour in an Imperfect Environment’, Gilles, R.P. and Ruys, P.H.M. (Eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam. (To appear) ai]•_Myerson, R.B. (1977). “Graphs and cooperation in games”, Math. Oper. Res. 2, 225–229.Google Scholar
  2. •.
    Neumann, J. von and Morgenstern, O. (1944). “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” (3rd edition, 1953), Princeton University Press, Princeton.Google Scholar
  3. •.
    Shapley, L.S. (1953). “A value for n-person games”, in: Contributions to the Theory of Games, II (Eds. Tucker, A.W. and Kuhn, H.), Ann. Math. Studies 28, Princeton University Press, 307–317.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • V. Feltkamp
    • 1
  • A. van den Nouweland
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of EconometricsTilburg UniversityTilburgNetherlands

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