Controlled Communication Networks
In a cooperative TU (Transferable Utility) game (N, v) as modelled by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), N is a finite set of players, and the characteristic function v assigns to each subgroup of players a real number which is to be interpreted as the maximal gains this coalition can secure by cooperating.
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