Kartellverfolgung in der Europäischen Union: Überblick und empirische Evidenz

  • Kai Hüschelrath
Part of the WiWi klipp & klar book series (WIWIKK)


Im vierten Kapitel des Lehrbuchs erfolgt eine Erweiterung der Analyse von EU-Kartellen um den Prozess der EU-Kartellverfolgung. Dieser schließt neben der Analyse und Entscheidung durch die Europäische Kommission auch (etwaige) gerichtliche Untersuchungen mit ein. Aufbauend auf einem umfangreichen qualitativ-empirischen Überblick des Kartellverfolgungsprozesses in der Europäischen Union, liegen die ersten beiden Schwerpunkte auf ökonometrischen Studien der Wirksamkeit des Kronzeugenprogramms bzw. des Verständigungsverfahrens. Im Anschluss daran erfolgt eine Analyse des gerichtlichen Berufungsverfahrens, die sich aufteilt in eine Betrachtung von Determinanten der Nutzung des Verfahrens einerseits sowie von Determinanten der Dauer der entsprechenden gerichtlichen Untersuchungen andererseits.


  1. Abrantes-Metz, R., Connor, J., & Metz, A. (2012). The determinants of cartel duration. Working paper, Purdue University, West Lafayette.Google Scholar
  2. Adelstein, R. (1978). The plea bargain in theory: A behavioral model of the negotiated guilty plea. Southern Economic Journal, 44, 488–503.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Adelstein, R. (2007). Economics of plea bargaining. Division II Faculty Publications. Paper 94, Middletown.Google Scholar
  4. Ascione, A., & Motta, M. (2008). Settlements in cartel cases. EU competition law and policy workshop/proceedings, Florence.Google Scholar
  5. Baxter, W. (1980). The political economy of antitrust. In R. Tollison (Hrsg.), The political economy of antitrust (S. 3–49). Lexington: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
  6. Bellis, J.-F. (2014). Cartel settlements. Van Bael & Bellis, Presentation, Madrid.Google Scholar
  7. Brankin, S.-P. (2008). All settled: Where are the European Commission’s settlement proposals post consultation? Competition Law Journal, 7, 170–181.Google Scholar
  8. Brenner, S. (2009). An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 639–645.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Brenner, S. (2011). Self-disclosure at international cartels. Journal of International Business Studies, 42, 221–224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Bueren, E. (2011). Verständigungen – Settlements in Kartellbußgeldverfahren: Eine Untersuchung des Vergleichsverfahrens der Kommission mit einer rechtsvergleichenden und rechtsökonomischen Analyse. Baden-Baden: Nomos.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Bueren, E., Hüschelrath, K., & Veith, T. (2016). Time is money – But how much money is time? Interest and inflation in competition law actions for damages. Antitrust Law Journal, 81, 271–336.Google Scholar
  12. Burke, W. (2009). Fitting and interpreting Cragg’s tobit alternative using Stata. Stata Journal, 9, 584–592.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Carree, M., Günster, A., & Schinkel, M. (2010). European antitrust policy 1957–2004: An analysis of Commission decisions. Review of Industrial Organization, 36, 97–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Chopard, B., Marion, E., & Roussey, L. (2014). Appeals process, judicial errors and crime deterrence. Working paper, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre.Google Scholar
  15. Connor, J. (2006). Optimal deterrence and private international cartels. Working paper, Purdue University, West Lafayette.Google Scholar
  16. Cooter, R., & Rubinfeld, D. (1989). Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution. Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1067–1097.Google Scholar
  17. Cooter, R., & Ulen, T. (2000). Law and economics (3. Aufl.). Reading: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
  18. Cragg, J. (1971). Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods. Econometrica, 39, 829–844.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Cremers, K., & Schliessler, P. (2012). Patent litigation settlement in Germany – Why parties settle during trial. ZEW discussion paper no. 12-084, Mannheim.Google Scholar
  20. Daughety, A., & Reinganum, J. (2000). Appealing judgments. RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 502–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. De, O. (2010). Analysis of cartel duration: Evidence from EC prosecuted cartels. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 17, 33–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Eisenberg, T. (2004). Appeal rates and outcomes in tried and nontried cases: Further exploration of anti-plaintiff appellate outcomes. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 1, 659–688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Eisenberg, T., & Farber, H. (1997). The litigious plaintiff hypothesis: Case selection and resolution. RAND Journal of Economics, 28, S92–S112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Eisenberg, T., & Farber, H. (2013). Why do plaintiffs lose appeals? Biased trial courts, litigious losers, or low trial win rates? American Law and Economics Review, 15, 73–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Ellis, C., & Wilson, W. (2001). What doesn’t kill us makes us stronger: An analysis of corporate leniency policy. Working paper, University of Oregon, Eugene.Google Scholar
  26. Espinosa, R., Desrieux, C., & Wan, H. (2017). Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courts. European Journal of Law and Economics, 43, 195–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Europäische Kommission. (2017). Quality of public administration – A toolbox for practitioners (Theme 7: Quality justice systems). Luxemburg: Europäische Kommission.Google Scholar
  28. Givati, Y. (2014). Legal institutions and social values: Theory and evidence from plea bargaining regimes. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 11, 867–893.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Green, E., & Porter, R. (1984). Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica, 52, 87–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Günster, A., Carree, M., & Schinkel, M. (2010). A statistical analysis of court of appeals rulings in European antitrust enforcement, 1957–2004. Working paper, University of Maastricht, Maastricht.Google Scholar
  31. Haltiwanger, J., & Harrington, J. (1991). The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior. RAND Journal of Economics, 22, 89–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Harrington, J. (2008). Optimal corporate leniency programs. Journal of Industrial Economics, 56, 215–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Harrington, J. (2013). Corporate leniency programs when firms have private information: The push of prosecution and the pull of pre-emption. Journal of Industrial Economics, 61, 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Heim, S., Hüschelrath, K., Laitenberger, U., & Spiegel, Y. (2018). Minority share acquisitions and collusion: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs. CEPR discussion paper DP13327, London.Google Scholar
  35. Hellwig, M., & Hüschelrath, K. (2017). Cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process in the European Union 2001–2015: A quantitative assessment. Antitrust Bulletin, 62, 400–438.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Hellwig, M., Hüschelrath, K., & Laitenberger, U. (2018), Settlements and appeals in the European Commission‘s cartel cases: An empirical assessment. Review of Industrial Organization, 52, 55-84.Google Scholar
  37. Hoang, C. T., Hüschelrath, K., Laitenberger, U., & Smuda, F. (2014). Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. International Review of Law and Economics, 40, 15–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Hüschelrath, K., & Laitenberger, U. (2017). The settlement procedure in the European Commission’s cartel cases: An early evaluation. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5, 458–487.Google Scholar
  39. Hüschelrath, K., & Smuda, F. (2016). The appeals process in the European Commission’s cartel cases: An empirical assessment. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 13, 330–357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Kelley, M. (2010). Settling for settlement: The European Commission’s new cartel settlement procedure. Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 9, 699–720.Google Scholar
  41. La Casse, C., & Payne, A. (1999). Federal sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences: Do defendants bargain in the shadow of the judge? Journal of Law and Economics, 42, 245–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Laina, F., & Bogdanov, A. (2014). The EU cartel settlement procedure: Latest developments. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 5, 717–727.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Laina, F., & Laurinen, E. (2013). The EU cartel settlement procedure: Current status and challenges. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 4, 302–311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Landes, W. (1971). An economic analysis of the courts. Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 61–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Levenstein, M., & Suslow, V. (2006). What determines cartel success? Journal of Economic Literature, 44, 43–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Levy, G. (2005). Careerist judges and the appeals process. RAND Journal of Economics, 36, 275–297.Google Scholar
  47. Martineau, R. (1984). Frivolous appeals: The uncertain federal response. Duke Law Journal, 5, 845–886.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Marvao, C. (2014). Heterogeneous penalties and private information (Konkurrensverket working paper series in law and economics 2014:1). Stockholm.Google Scholar
  49. Miceli, T. (1996). Plea bargaining and deterrence: An institutional approach. European Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 249–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Miceli, T. (2009). The economic approach to law. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  51. Motchenkova, E., & van der Laan, R. (2005). Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms. Center discussion paper no. 2005-74, Tilburg University, Tilburg.Google Scholar
  52. Motta, M., & Polo, M. (2003). Leniency programs and cartel prosecution. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 347–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Nobles, R., & Schiff, D. (2002). The right to appeal and workable systems of justice. Modern Law Review, 65, 676–701.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. OECD. (2006). Plea bargaining/settlement of cartel cases. Report no. DAF/COMP(2007)38, Paris.Google Scholar
  55. OECD. (2012). Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations. Report no. DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, Paris.Google Scholar
  56. Posner, R. (1973). An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration. Journal of Legal Studies, 2, 399–458.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Rotemberg, J., & Saloner, G. (1986). A supergame-theoretic model of business cycle and price wars during booms. American Economic Review, 76, 390–407.Google Scholar
  58. Shavell, S. (1982). The social versus private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal system. Journal of Legal Studies, 11, 222–339.Google Scholar
  59. Shavell, S. (1995). The appeals process as a means of error correction. Journal of Legal Studies, 24, 379–426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Shavell, S. (2006). The appeals process and adjudicator incentives. Journal of Legal Studies, 35, 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Shavell, S. (2010). On the design of the appeals process: The optimal use of discretionary review versus direct appeal. Journal of Legal Studies, 39, 63–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  62. Smuda, F. (2014). Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 10, 63–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Smuda, F., Bougette, P., & Hüschelrath, K. (2015). Determinants of the duration of European appellate court proceedings in cartel cases. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53, 1352–1369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. Spagnolo, G. (2005). Divide et impera: Optimal leniency programs. CEPR discussion paper no. 4840, London.Google Scholar
  65. van Ginderachter, E. (2014). European Commission’s settlement procedure – A success story. Presentation, Madrid.Google Scholar
  66. Vascott, D. (2013). EU cartel settlements: Are they working? Global Competition Review News.Google Scholar
  67. Veljanovski, C. (2007). Cartel fines in Europe: Law, practice and deterrence. World Competition, 30, 65–86.Google Scholar
  68. Veljanovski, C. (2011). Deterrence, recidivism, and European cartel fines. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 7, 871–915.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Zhou, J. (2012). Evaluating leniency with missing information on undetected cartels: Exploring time-varying policy impacts on cartel duration. TILEC discussion paper no. 353, Tilburg University, Tilburg.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kai Hüschelrath
    • 1
  1. 1.Hochschule SchmalkaldenSchmalkaldenDeutschland

Personalised recommendations