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Neo-corporatism and the responsiveness of democracy

  • Marius R. BusemeyerEmail author
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Abstract

In this chapter, I want to discuss the relationship between neo-corporatism as a form of interest group representation and prevailing inequalities in democratic representation and responsiveness. In much of the existing literature on the role of public opinion and democratic policy-making (most of it from the US), interest group influence is portrayed as something that distracts policy-makers from implementing the will of the people, catering to ‘special interests’ instead. In contrast, the core normative foundation of corporatist decision-making is based on the idea that corporatist institutions are superior to interest group pluralism in the sense that corporatism ensures a proper representation of those interests that are difficult to organize and mobilize. In my contribution, I want to provide a critical theoretical discussion of the promises and challenges of corporatist decision-making in relation to the normative goal of ensuring a responsive and representative democracy, drawing on the work of Klaus Armingeon and others.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität KonstanzKonstanzGermany

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