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Moral hazard and group sample observation

  • Matthias RödlEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Management, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse book series (MOÖA)

Abstract

The relationship between insurer and insured frequently bears the issue of opposing incentives concerning preventive efforts once the mitigation of risk has taken place; this topic is commonly known as moral hazard. One solution to this dilemma is observation. This chapter is dedicated to exploring the potential of aggregating two insured individuals into an interdependent group for the purpose of reducing observation costs.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.VallendarGermany

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