Advertisement

Effektivität militärischer Leistung

Omnis arbor quae non facit fructum bonum exciditur et in ignem mittitur
  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Ob und inwiefern die erzeugten militärischen Fähigkeiten tatsächlich die doktrinären Ziele durchsetzen können, ist in Friedenszeiten unbekannt. Erst der tatsächliche Konflikt schafft eine Umgebung, in der die Effektivität militärischer Fähigkeiten unter Beweis gestellt werden muss. Wendet man die evolutionäre Theorie (Hannan und Freeman 1984; Burgelman 1991) auf militärische Organisationen an, so bevölkern diese eine Selektionsumgebung, innerhalb derer sie miteinander in Wettbewerb stehen. In diesem Wettbewerb setzen sie ihre militärischen Fähigkeiten ein, um den eigenen gegenüber dem gegnerischen Willen durchzusetzen und somit ihren Auftrag zu erfüllen (Clausewitz 1994). Entsprechend lässt sich ein militärischer Konflikt als Selektionsereignis interpretieren, dessen Ausgang objektiv darüber informiert, ob das Militär seine Aufträge erfüllt hat.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literatur

  1. Alchian AA (1950) Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy 58:211-221CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Beck R (2016) Die Revolution des Landkriegs. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15.09.2016Google Scholar
  3. Boettke PJ, Coyne CJ, Leeson PT (2008) Institutional stickiness and the new development economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67:331-358CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Boettke PJ, Coyne CJ, Leeson PT (2007) Saving government failure theory from itself: Recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective. Constitutional Political Economy 18:127-143CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Buchanan JM (1990) The domain of constitutional economics. Constitutional Political Economy 1:1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Burgelman RA (1991) Interorganizational ecology of strategy making and organizational adaptation: Theory and field research. Organization Science 2:239-262CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Clausewitz C (1994) Vom Kriege. Reclam, StuttgartGoogle Scholar
  8. Coffey T, Montgomery JA (2002) The emergence of mini UAVs for military applications. National Defense University, Washington DCGoogle Scholar
  9. Defense News (2016) New warship’s big guns have no bullets. Defense News, 07.11.2016Google Scholar
  10. Echevarria AJ (2016) Rediscovering US military strategy: A role for doctrine. Journal of Strategic Studies 39:231-245CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Eisenhardt KM, Martin JA (2000) Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management Journal 21:1105-1121CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Figes O (2012) The Crimean war: A history. Picador, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  13. Fitzgerald AE (1989) The Pentagonists: An insider’s view of waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense spending. Houghton Mifflin, BostonGoogle Scholar
  14. Flugrevue (2017) Österreich phast Eurofighter aus. Online-Ausgabe vom 07.07.2017Google Scholar
  15. Fortune A, Mitchell W (2012) Unpacking firm exit at the firm and industry levels: The adaptation and selection of firm capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 33:794-819CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. General Accounting Office (2017) Report GAO-17-317 (High risk series). Office of Public Affairs, Washington DCGoogle Scholar
  17. Goodwin P, Wright G (2010) The limits of forecasting methods in anticipating rare events. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77:355-368CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Grant RM (1996) Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal Summer Special Issue 17:109-122CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Grüne M (2013) Technologiefrühaufklärung im Verteidigungsbereich. In: Popp R, Zweck A (Hrsg) Zukunftsforschung im Praxistest. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, 195-230CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Gupta S, Clements B, Bhattacharya R, Chakravarti S (2002) The elusive peace dividend. Finance and Development 39:49-51Google Scholar
  21. Hannan M, Freeman J (1984) Structural inertia and organizational change. American Sociological Review 49:149-164CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Hartley K (1995) Industrial policies in the defense sector. In Hartley K, Sandler T (Eds) (1995) Handbook of defense economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam et al., 459-489Google Scholar
  23. Hartley K (2007) The arms industry, procurement and industrial policies. In Sandler T, Hartley K (Eds) Handbook of defense economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam et al., 1139-1176Google Scholar
  24. Helfat C, Peteraf M (2003) The dynamic resource-based view: Capability lifecycles. Strategic Management Journal, October Special Issue 24:997-1010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Helfat CE (1997) Know-how and asset complementarity and dynamic capability accumulation. Strategic Management Journal 18:339-360CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Henderson RM, Cockburn I (1994) Measuring competence: Exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research. Strategic Management Journal, Winter Special Issue 15: 63-84CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Kim YW, Brown T (2012) The importance of contract design. Public Administration Review 72:687-696CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Lenz C (2017) Parmelin sucht dringend 100 Cyberkrieger. Tages-Anzeiger, 07.08.2017Google Scholar
  29. Mayer KR (1992) Elections, business cycles, and the timing of defense contract awards in the United States. In Mintz A (Ed) (1992) The political economy of military spending in the United States. Routledge, New York, 15-32Google Scholar
  30. McNeill WH (2013) The pursuit of power: Technology, armed force, and society since AD 1000. University of Chicago Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  31. Moulton JL (1971) Defence planning: The uncertainty factor. Long Range Planning 3:50-53CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Nelson RR, Winter SG (1982) An evolutionary theory of economic change. Belknap Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  33. Nielsen SC (2010) An army transformed: The U.S. Army’s post-Vietnam recovery and the dynamics of change in military organizations. U.S Army War College, CarlisleGoogle Scholar
  34. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2004) Die Schweiz wird für die Armee zu klein. 15.02.2004.Google Scholar
  35. Owen N (1994) How many men do armed forces need? An international comparison. Defence and Peace Economics 5:269–288CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Pejovich S (2003) Understanding the transaction costs of transition: It’s the culture, stupid. Review of Austrian Economics 16:347–361Google Scholar
  37. Percia David D, Keupp MM, Marino R, Hofstetter P (2018) The persistent deficit of militia officers in the Swiss Armed Forces: An opportunity cost explanation. Defence and Peace Economics, forthcomingGoogle Scholar
  38. Pisano GP (1994) Knowledge, integration, and the locus of learning: An empirical analysis of process development. Strategic Management Journal, Winter Special Issue 15:85-100CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Reinhardt JR, James JE, Flanagan EM (1999) Future employment of UAVS: Issues of jointness. National Defence University, Washington DCGoogle Scholar
  40. Schediwy R (2014) Rückblick auf die Moderne. LIT Verlag, Berlin et al.Google Scholar
  41. SIPRI (2017) Military expenditure by country as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1949-2016. SIPRI, StockholmGoogle Scholar
  42. Smirnoff JP, Hicks MJ (2008) The impact of economic factors and acquisition reforms on the cost of defense weapon systems. Review of Financial Economics 17:3–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Solomon B, Chouinard P, Kerzner L (2008) The Department of National Defence strategic cost model, volume II – theory and empirics. Defence R&D Canada-CORA, OttawaGoogle Scholar
  44. Stulberg AN (2007) Managing the unmanned revolution in the US Air Force. Orbis 51:251-265CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Teece DJ, Pisano G, Shuen A (1997) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal 18:509-533CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Tripsas M, Gavetti G (2000) Capabilities, cognition, and inertia: Evidence from digital imaging. Strategic Management Journal 21:1147–1161CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Varian H (2014) Intermediate microeconomics: A modern approach. W.W. Norton & Co, New York et alGoogle Scholar
  48. Vaubel R (1999) Enforcing competition among governments: Theory and application to the European Union. Constitutional Political Economy 10:327–338CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Wagner R (1989) To promote the general welfare. Pacific Research Institute, San FranciscoGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
    • 1
  1. 1.Militärakademie an der ETH ZürichZürichSchweiz

Personalised recommendations