The Issues of Interlinkage
Trade and environment issues are interwoven in various ways. Before entering into any analysis this chapter first categorizes the interlinkages. For illustration it also gives details of selected recent cases of international awareness.
KeywordsEnvironmental Policy Trade Liberalization Former Soviet Union North American Free Trade Agreement Uruguay Round
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- 3.The overview of the case draws on U.S. Congress (1992), p. 89; an early reference is “Freedom to be Cleaner Than the Rest,” The Economist, October 14, 1989.Google Scholar
- 4.GATT Trade Negotiations Committee (1991), commonly “Dunkel draft”, in its proposals on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (commonly SPS Code), p. L.46, paragraph 3.Google Scholar
- 5.Arden- Clarke (1991), pp. 27–28; and as cited in U.S. Congress (1992): Wysham (1990), pp. 770–73; Hillard (1991), pp. 27–28.Google Scholar
- 7.GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994), p. 69; see Annex A definitions, p. 77.Google Scholar
- 8.For an evaluation of the harmonization approach in detail see Steininger (1994), also comparing the case of harmonization for product regulation, which is promising, with the one of process regulation in view in this section.Google Scholar
- 9.Uimonen and Whalley (1994 forthcoming (fall), draft 1991), pp.22.Google Scholar
- 14.U.S. Congress (1992), p. 40, based on Pagel, Mark and Ruth Mace (1991), Keeping the Ivory Trade Banned, Nature, vol. 351, May 23, pp. 265–66 and on Aldous, Peter (1991), African Rift in Kyoto, Nature, vol. 354, November 21, pp. 175.Google Scholar
- 18.GATT Secretariat (1992), p. 21: “It is often a challenge just to get a critical mass of countries - let alone all countries - to participate in an international environmental agreement. [..] Trade measures could be used as one type of ‘carrot’ or [..] as one type of ‘stick’ to encourage participation.”Google Scholar
- 19.Hoel (1992a), section 9. For the case of significant CO2 reduction targets he, as most economists, also objects to the uniform reduction schemes arguing not only on the grounds of economic inefficiency, but also on the then only low incentive for sufficiently large participation, “since such a scheme gives a distribution of costs of reducing emissions which may differ strongly from the advantages the countries have from avoiding climatic changes.”Google Scholar