AMASIVE: An Adaptable and Modular Autonomous Side-Channel Vulnerability Evaluation Framework

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8260)


Over the last decades computer aided engineering (CAE) tools have been developed and improved in order to ensure a short time-to-market in the chip design business. Up to now, these design tools do not yet support a design strategy for the development of side-channel resistant hardware implementations. In this chapter we introduce a novel engineering framework named AMASIVE (Adaptable Modular Autonomous SIde-Channel Vulnerability Evaluator), which supports the designer in implementing side-channel hardened devices. An attacker model is introduced for the analysis and the evaluation of a given cryptographic design in regard to application-specific vulnerabilities and exploitations. We demonstrate its application to a hardware implementation of the block cipher PRESENT.


Security Analysis Block Cipher Attack Model Leakage Model Hypothesis Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Integrated Circuits and Systems Lab, Computer Science Dept.Technische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Physical Analysis and Cryptographic Engineering, SPMSNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore
  3. 3.Engineering Cryptographic Protocols GroupEC-SPRIDEGermany

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