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Collective Evolutionary Dynamics and Spatial Reciprocity under the N-Person Snowdrift Game

  • Marta D. Santos
  • Francisco C. Santos
  • Jorge M. Pacheco
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 87)

Abstract

The evolution of cooperation has been gathering increasing attention during the last decades. Most of the times, cooperative behavior involves more than two individuals, and the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is the most studied generalized social dilemma in this context, not always manages to capture those situations that often occur to humans. In such cases, the N-person Snowdrift Game (NSG) often provides an adequate alternative. Here we show, making use of the NSG, how spatial populations affect the average levels of cooperation, when compared with the results obtained under conventional evolutionary game theory, that is, for well-mixed populations.

Keywords

Cooperation Evolution Evolutionary Game Theory Diversity 
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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marta D. Santos
    • 1
  • Francisco C. Santos
    • 2
  • Jorge M. Pacheco
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.ATP-GroupCMAFLisboaPortugal
  2. 2.DEI & INESC-ID, Instituto Superior TécnicoTU LisbonLisboaPortugal
  3. 3.Departamento de Matemática e AplicaçõesUniversidade do MinhoBragaPortugal

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