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Interpretation of the Basic Law by the Courts of the Macao SAR

  • Jorge Menezes
Conference paper

When I was invited to talk about the interpretation of the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR), I soon realised the relevance and extension of the topic. I chose to approach one part within the myriad of issues that one could explore under the title of the paper that I was given. The scope of this paper reflects this approach. The paper aims to determine the legal system, web of values and legal traditions to which the courts of the Macao SAR ought to refer to when carrying out interpretations of provisions of the Basic Law “which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region” (as mentioned in Article 143 of the Basic Law). Although it includes a section on Article 143 and the Standing Committee, the paper is essentially about the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Macao SAR Courts.1 The reader will therefore not find in this article answers to many other questions posed when discussing the interpretation of the Basic Law.

I will start this paper by quoting a Judge from the Court of Second Instance (or Court of Appeal) who in his dissenting opinion to a recent ruling made the following statement:

Keywords

Legal System Legal Order Basic Policy Legal Tradition National People 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jorge Menezes
    • 1
  1. 1.Wolfson College, University of OxfordOxfordUK

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