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Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem

  • Alexander Pepper
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter takes as its starting point Mancur Olson’s assertion in The Logic of Collective Action that his theory of group size and group behaviour has implications for the governance of companies. It explains why shareholders of public corporations are unlikely to solve executive pay problems because of a collective action problem, and how ideas about the governance of common pool resources have implications for the design of corporate governance mechanisms. A study of the FTSE 100 is used to illustrate the points raised.

Keywords

Collective action Corporate governance Common pool resources 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Pepper
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of ManagementLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK

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