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Efficient Traceable Oblivious Transfer and Its Applications

  • Weiwei Liu
  • Yinghui Zhang
  • Yi Mu
  • Guomin Yang
  • Yangguang Tian
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11125)

Abstract

Oblivious transfer (OT) has been applied widely in privacy-sensitive systems such as on-line transactions and electronic commerce to protect users’ private information. Traceability is an interesting feature of such systems that the privacy of the dishonest users could be traced by the service provider or a trusted third party (TTP). However, previous research on OT mainly focused on designing protocols with unconditional receiver’s privacy. Thus, traditional OT schemes cannot fulfill the traceability requirements in the aforementioned applications. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting a novel traceable oblivious transfer (TOT) without involvement of any TTP. In the new system, an honest receiver is able to make a fixed number of choices with perfect receiver privacy. If the receiver misbehaves and tries to request more than a pre-fixed number of choices, then all his previous choices could be traced by the sender. We first give the formal definition and security model of TOT, then propose an efficient TOT scheme, which is proven secure under the proposed security model.

Keywords

Oblivious transfer Secret sharing Privacy Traceability 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (2017YFB0802000), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61772418, 61402366). Yinghui Zhang is supported by New Star Team of Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications (2016-02).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Weiwei Liu
    • 1
    • 4
  • Yinghui Zhang
    • 2
    • 3
  • Yi Mu
    • 4
  • Guomin Yang
    • 4
  • Yangguang Tian
    • 5
  1. 1.School of Mathematics and StatisticsNorth China University of Water Resources and Electric PowerZhengzhouChina
  2. 2.National Engineering Laboratory for Wireless SecurityXi’an University of Posts and TelecommunicationsXi’anChina
  3. 3.Westone Cryptologic Research CenterBeijingChina
  4. 4.Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology,School of Computing and Information TechnologyUniversity of WollongongWollongongAustralia
  5. 5.School of Information SystemsSingapore Management UniversitySingaporeSingapore

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