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Synthesis of a Permissive Security Monitor

  • Narges Khakpour
  • Charilaos Skandylas
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11098)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new sound method to synthesize a permissive monitor using boolean supervisory controller synthesis that observes a Java program at certain checkpoints, predicts information flow violations and applies suitable countermeasures to prevent violations. To improve the permissiveness, we train the monitor and remove false positives by executing the program along with its executable model. If a security violation is detected, the user can define sound countermeasures, including declassification to apply in the checkpoints. We implement a tool that automates the whole process and generates a monitor. We evaluate our method by applying it on the Droidbench benchmark and one real-life Android application.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Linnaeus UniversityVäxjöSweden

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