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Attack Tree Construction and Its Application to the Connected Vehicle

  • Khaled Karray
  • Jean-Luc Danger
  • Sylvain Guilley
  • M. Abdelaziz Elaabid
Chapter

Abstract

Remote connectivity of today’s and future cars increases their capabilities of autonomy and safety, but also their attack surface, as reported by several research papers. In the automotive domain, the security has a direct impact on the user’s safety. Thus, the management of risk is becoming the main concern of automotive manufacturers, especially for the future fully connected and autonomous cars. A possible way to quantify the overall risk of a system is the systematic construction of attack graphs and attack trees. These formalisms are presented as one of the possible solutions in the new Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems (SAE-J3061). In this chapter we propose to use graph transformation to formally model the car architecture and its state evolution in order to study cyber-physical attacks against it. The resulting attacks are converted into attack trees which are used to estimate the overall risk of the system. Consequently, it becomes possible to study improvements while building a more secure architecture. The proposed method is designed to support the conceptual phase of the vehicle’s cyber-physical system. We illustrate the method on a small pedagogical example to show how it is possible to prove its efficiency.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Khaled Karray
    • 1
  • Jean-Luc Danger
    • 1
    • 2
  • Sylvain Guilley
    • 1
    • 3
    • 4
  • M. Abdelaziz Elaabid
    • 5
  1. 1.Télécom ParisTechParisFrance
  2. 2.Secure-IC S.A.S.Cesson-SévignéFrance
  3. 3.Secure-ICParisFrance
  4. 4.École normale supérieureParisFrance
  5. 5.PSA-GROUPEParisFrance

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