Informational Lobbying in the EU: Mechanisms of Probity, Dissembling, and Transparency

  • Adam William ChalmersEmail author


This chapter examines questions of dissembling and probity in informational lobbying in the EU. Scholars have long acknowledged that information is at the very heart of EU lobbying. Information is used as a form of lobbying currency that not only grants interest groups access to decision-making processes but also the opportunity to shape policy outcomes in their favor. But to what extent do interest groups provide inaccurate, incomplete, and even erroneous information? What incentives do they have to be honest, and what safeguards can policymakers implement to ensure the receipt of accurate information? This chapter explores these questions from both an interest group and policymaker perspective.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of European and International StudiesKing’s College LondonLondonUK

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