Business Lobbying in International Investment Policy-Making in Europe

  • Robert BasedowEmail author


Does European business lobby in international investment policy and notably for the conclusion of international investment agreements? The chapter argues that business is little involved in this policy domain due to limited perceived welfare effects. Theories of public choice and bureaucratic politics may better account for policy outcomes. The chapter verifies these hypotheses in case studies of international investment policy-making in Germany and the European Union. Finally, the chapter raises the question of whether the exceptional, vocal involvement of European business in the debates on investment regulation under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) might be the result of policy-maker influence on the business community. The findings imply that policy-makers may be freer in reforming their approach to international investment policy and international investment agreements than assumed.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.European Institute, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK

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