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The European Union’s Revolving Door Problem

  • Margarida SilvaEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

A recent string of scandals involving senior EU officials has reignited the debate of the EU’s revolving doors, meaning the transition of politicians or civil servants from public office into lobby jobs and vice versa. Such transitions create a host of potential and actual conflicts of interest, such as the risk that former officials will use their insider know-how, privileged contact network and reputation in ways that influence EU policy-making and that can unduly benefit private interests. The current article examines cases collated in the RevolvingDoorWatch database to review the rules currently in place and their implementation. It highlights the revolving door phenomenon as a cross-cutting issue in the EU that covers the European Parliament and the Commission across several levels of seniority and policy areas. It further adds to growing evidence that revolving door type of conflicts requires stricter rules and scrutiny but also a change in political culture.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Corporate Europe ObservatoryBrusselsBelgium

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