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Introduction: Getting to Know Our Own Minds

  • Julie KirschEmail author
  • Patrizia Pedrini
Chapter
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 96)

Abstract

Our project is to answer questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self-knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, our authors focus on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. We regard the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and our contributors try to clarify the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. We also invite cooperation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology about issues regarding self-knowledge.

Keywords

Self-knowledge First-person self-knowledge Third-person self-knowledge Self-interpretation Narrative 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Liberal ArtsD’Youville CollegeBuffaloUSA
  2. 2.Department of Letters and PhilosophyUniversity of FlorenceFirenzeItaly

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