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Powers of the Gun: Process and Possibility in Global Small Arms Control

  • Mike BourneEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are the principal tools of armed violence, but the development of a global ‘regime’ has been a fragmented and fragile process that reinforces sovereignty more than it regulates violence. This article argues that rather than a settled regime, the global processes on SALW is better understood as a ‘global assemblage.’ Drawing on ‘new materialism’ and process philosophy, the chapter draws attention to the ways in which unity and diversity co-exist and co-constitute each other. Indeed, one of the key features of the SALW process has been the continuous production of both agreements and disagreements in which the meaning of consensus (as well as the specific commitments agreed) are shifting. The forms of power that constitute the regime are themselves produced as a global collective for action and particular modes of action on SALW are composed.

Keywords

Small arms and light weapons Assemblage Disagreement Consensus Standardisation 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Queen’s University BelfastBelfastUK

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