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The International Regime Prohibiting Chemical Weapons and Its Evolution

  • Alexander Kelle
Chapter

Abstract

The chemical weapons prohibition regime is unique among the regimes addressing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It qualifies as a strong prohibition regime with a high norm density and a dedicated international organisation to verify implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and assist states parties with its implementation, nationally and internationally. The paper adopts a broader institutional approach and utilises elements of historical institutionalism to analyse the evolution of the regime. More specifically it addresses the norms providing guidance to states on chemical weapons disarmament, non-proliferation, national implementation, and assistance and protection against chemical weapons use before discussing Syrian accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and its implications for evolution of the regime as it seeks to transition to a world free of chemical weapons.

Keywords

Chemical weapons Chemical weapons convention Prohibition regime Organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons Disarmament Historical institutionalism 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Kelle
    • 1
  1. 1.OPCWThe HagueThe Netherlands

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