Evolutionary and Disciplinary Characteristics of Regime Theorization
This chapter analyzes the significance of regime theory, or theory of regimes, for the field of International Relations. Specifically, it tries to reflect on theoretical affinities between the two, namely to recast regime theory as IR theory. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses existing IR theorization of regimes which has coalesced around three specific “waves” of regimes theorization: the neo-neo-convergence regime theory; cognitivism; and radical constructivism/post-structuralism. Second, it assesses heuristic utility of the three waves of regime theorization in relation to possible domains of empirical application. Finally, more general trends in relation to heuristics are discerned and flagged in the conclusion.
KeywordsRegime theory Regimes Theorization Neo-realism Neo-Liberal institutionalism Cognitivism Constructivism Post-structuralism Heuristics
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