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Public Goods, Club Goods and Specialization in Evolving Collaborative Entities

  • Vasilis Zervos
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for Growth book series (DIG)

Abstract

Since the days of Adam Smith the concept of specialization and the invisible hand has seen applications throughout the macroeconomy such as global trade patterns and competitive forces, but also at the microeconomic level through the specialization of firms and cooperative entities. This chapter examines the welfare economics implementation in EU and ESA within the above context, focusing on specialization in alliances and the provision of public goods with relevant compensating mechanisms, drawing analogues between the macroeconomy and the space institutional sector. The analysis shows how, in the absence of pure pubic goods within a collaborative entity, the transformation of a collaborative entity into an industrial mechanism of support for commercial benefit maximization results in inefficient allocative outcomes.

Keywords

Institutional economics Specialization Welfare Space sector 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vasilis Zervos
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, University of Strasbourg (BETA)StrasbourgFrance
  2. 2.International Space University (ISU)StrasbourgFrance

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