The traditional debate about the norm connecting judgement and truth assumes a monistic conception (Normative Alethic Monism, NAM) where truth’s normative function is expressed by a single principle applicable to all judgements. I argue that NAM falls prey to a variation of the scope problem originally put forward by Michael Lynch against alethic (substantivist) monism. NAM is unable to account for an often-overlooked variability in the normative significance of enquiry-related phenomena such as disagreement. By means of examples from different areas of discourse, I show how the kind of normative reaction elicited by the presence of disagreement varies in relation to the subject matter. This kind of variability cannot be accounted for by NAM. In reply to this problem, I outline Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP). NAP consists of two theses: (plurality) there is more than one way in which truth regulates judgement; (variability) the normative function that truth exerts on judgements varies in relation to the specific subject matter at issue. I argue that NAP is superior to NAM by showing that it helps dealing with the normative scope problem. Lastly, I scrutinise the explanatory relationships between NAP and pluralism about truth. I will argue that although the two pictures complement each other quite nicely, they are nonetheless independent.
Normativity Scope problem Disagreement Basic taste Refined aesthetics Morality Normative alethic monism Normative alethic pluralism Truth (alethic) pluralism
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