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Methodological Pluralism About Truth

  • Nathan Kellen
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

This chapter analyses various truth pluralist views in the literature by their methodological commitments. I argue that truth pluralism is best interpreted as a combination of (semantic) realism and anti-realism, and as the spiritual successor to Michael Dummett’s global anti-realist programme. I introduce two ways of characterising pluralisms by how realist/anti-realist they are. I close by introducing and offering arguments in favour of what I call methodological pluralism about truth, which privileges neither its realist nor anti-realist forebears.

Keywords

Truth (alethic) pluralism Moderate truth (alethic) pluralism Strong truth (alethic) pluralism Truth Realism Anti-realism Dummett Methodological pluralism Methodological fundamentality Theoretical fundamentality 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nathan Kellen
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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