Methodological Pluralism About Truth
This chapter analyses various truth pluralist views in the literature by their methodological commitments. I argue that truth pluralism is best interpreted as a combination of (semantic) realism and anti-realism, and as the spiritual successor to Michael Dummett’s global anti-realist programme. I introduce two ways of characterising pluralisms by how realist/anti-realist they are. I close by introducing and offering arguments in favour of what I call methodological pluralism about truth, which privileges neither its realist nor anti-realist forebears.
KeywordsTruth (alethic) pluralism Moderate truth (alethic) pluralism Strong truth (alethic) pluralism Truth Realism Anti-realism Dummett Methodological pluralism Methodological fundamentality Theoretical fundamentality
- Gamester, W. 2017. The Diversity of Truth: A Case Study in Pluralistic Metasemantics. PhD Dissertation, University of Leeds.Google Scholar
- Künne, W. 2005. Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J.L.L., and S. Kim. 2018. Strong Truth Pluralism. In Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, ed. J. Wyatt, Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen, 107–130. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J.L.L., and M.P. Lynch. 2018. Truth Pluralism. In The Oxford Handbook of Truth, ed. M. Glanzberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar