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Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-Counting

  • Michael P. LynchEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

Simon Blackburn has recently alleged that truth pluralism “double-counts”: it distinguishes not only between different kinds of propositions; it (unnecessarily) distinguishes between different kinds of truth. In this chapter, I respond to this objection, arguing that, given certain explanatory goals that quasi-realists such as Blackburn or Price share with the pluralist, either distinction brings a functionally similar one in its wake.

Keywords

Truth Truth (alethic) pluralism Moderate truth (alethic) pluralism Truth (alethic) monism Deflationism Double-counting objection Realism Anti-realism debate Meaning Content Truth-aptitude Representation Quasi-realism (global) Expressivism Simon Blackburn Huw Price 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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