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Truth: One or Many or Both?

  • Dorit Bar-On
  • Keith Simmons
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

Truth pluralism is a metaphysical theory of the nature of truth. The pluralist rejects the deflationist claim that truth is at best a ‘shallow’, insubstantial property. Indeed, the pluralist embraces a plurality of truth properties (such as correspondence, superassertibility, coherence), each appropriate to a different domain (or domains) of discourse. On the face of it, the pluralist will inherit all the main problems of the various traditional substantivist theories of truth. In addition, a strong pluralist, who only recognizes a plurality of truth properties (so that truth emerges not as one but only many), faces a number of problems, such as the problem of mixed discourse. But the moderate pluralism, who acknowledges that there is, in addition to diverse truth properties, a single property of truth (so that truth emerges as both one and many), faces problems of her own. After raising specific difficulties we see with moderate pluralism, we propose a less extravagant way to preserve the metaphysical intuitions that motivate pluralism.

Keywords

Truth Truth (alethic) pluralism Moderate truth (alethic) pluralism Alethic monism Deflationism Double-counting objection Realism Anti-realism Meaning Truth-conditions Mixed discourse 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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