Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity
In this paper, I ask whether we should see different logical systems as appropriate for different domains (or perhaps in different contexts) and whether this would amount to a form of logical pluralism. One, though not the only, route to this type of position, is via pluralism about truth. Given that truth is central to validity, the commitment the typical truth pluralist has to different notions of truth for different domains may suggest differences regarding validity in those different domains. Indeed, as we’ll see, the differences between the proposed multiple notions of truth are often of a type that is clearly significant in relation to logical features, such as whether or not a constructive notion of truth is at issue. I criticise domain-based logical pluralism. Having done so I introduce a context-based framework that operates with a context-relative notion of validity. I show that this context-based framework can be employed by the domain-specific logical pluralist, but that framework also allows for logical pluralism that does not involve several domains. Different contexts may demand rules of classical logic, where others only justify intuitionistic rules, even when the same domain (e.g. mathematics) is at issue.
KeywordsTruth (alethic) pluralism Logical pluralism Domain-based logical pluralism Algebraic semantics Aaron Cotnoir Mixed inferences Vagueness Topic neutrality Context-relative validity Context-based logical pluralism
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