Pluralism About Pluralisms
This chapter is concerned with domain-specific alethic pluralism and domain-specific logical pluralism. If domain-specific alethic pluralism entails domain-specific logical pluralism, and vice versa, then in some sense we really only have one pluralism, not two. If, however, the two sorts of pluralism are independent of each other, then we truly have two distinct kinds of pluralism—that is, we have a plurality of pluralisms. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that domain-specific alethic pluralism does not entail domain-specific logical pluralism (contrary to arguments given by Lynch and Pedersen), nor does domain-specific logical pluralism entail domain-specific alethic pluralism, and hence we do have such a plurality of pluralisms. To accomplish this, in Sect. 2 I show how one can be a domain-specific logical pluralist while being a truth monist, and how one can be a domain-specific truth pluralist while being a logical monist. I will then, in Sect. 3, use the argument of Sect. 2 to identify the mistake in the arguments of Lynch and Pedersen. Section 4 will then further flesh out the model, distinguishing between different senses in which a domain might be epistemically constrained.
KeywordsLogical pluralism Domain-specific logical pluralism Domain-independent logical pluralism Truth (alethic) pluralism Epistemic constraint Superwarrant Correspondence Classical logic Intuitionistic logic Arithmetic Bivalence Law of excluded middle
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