Connective Meaning in Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism
Jc Beall and Greg Restall (Logical Pluralism. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006) propose a logical pluralism where the corresponding connectives in each logic mean the same thing. They contrast this with a Carnapian pluralism, where different logics have corresponding connectives which do not share meanings. I will show that due to the manner in which connectives are given their meaning by Beall and Restall, relevant negation and intuitionistic negation cannot mean the same thing. Thus, their pluralism is at least partly Carnapian, as not all the logics involved can have their corresponding connectives share meanings.
KeywordsLogical pluralism Beall and Restall pluralism Carnapian pluralism Logic Logical connectives Meaning Negation Intuitionistic negation Relevant negation Truth condition Maximal truth condition Minimal truth condition Jc Beall Greg Restall
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