Regime Structure, Institutional Stability and Pro-market Reforms

  • Luis Alfonso DauEmail author
  • Elizabeth M. Moore
  • Catherine Bradley
Part of the AIB Latin America book series (AIBLAT)


International business scholars have studied the impact of reforms on firm performance. Political economists have analyzed the impact of governance structure on macro-economic prosperity. However, little attention has been paid to how political regime and institutional stability affect reforms and performance at the firm level. This comparative case study, examining the dissimilar paths to pro-market reforms in Argentina and Chile, attempts to strengthen the tie between the political economy and international business literature through the impact that regime type has on institutional stability and how these in turn affect the relationship between reforms and firm performance. By examining the pro-market reform history in junction with exclusive interviews with CEOs and managers from each country, this chapter serves as a vehicle to foment a deeper dialogue between political economy and international business.


Firm profitability Pro-market reforms Institutional stability Regime type Democracy Authoritarianism 


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis Alfonso Dau
    • 1
    Email author
  • Elizabeth M. Moore
    • 1
  • Catherine Bradley
    • 1
  1. 1.Northeastern UniversityBostonUSA

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