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Is Java Card Ready for Hash-Based Signatures?

  • Ebo van der Laan
  • Erik Poll
  • Joost Rijneveld
  • Joeri de Ruiter
  • Peter Schwabe
  • Jan Verschuren
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11049)

Abstract

The current Java Card platform does not seem to allow for fast implementations of hash-based signature schemes. While the underlying implementation of the cryptographic primitives provided by the API can be fast, thanks to implementations in native code or in hardware, the cumulative overhead of the many separate API calls results in prohibitive performance for many common applications. In this work, we present an implementation of XMSS\(^{MT}\) on the current Java Card platform, and make suggestions how to improve this platform in future versions.

Keywords

Post-quantum cryptography Hash-based signatures Java Card XMSS\(^{MT}\) 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ebo van der Laan
    • 1
  • Erik Poll
    • 2
  • Joost Rijneveld
    • 2
  • Joeri de Ruiter
    • 2
  • Peter Schwabe
    • 2
  • Jan Verschuren
    • 1
  1. 1.Netherlands National Communication Security Agency (NLNCSA)The HagueThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Digital Security GroupRadboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands

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