From Collectives to Groups—Sartre and Stein on Joint Action and Emotional Sharing

  • Gerhard ThonhauserEmail author
Part of the Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences book series (WHPS, volume 1)


One of the main elements of Sartre’s original contribution to social ontology is his distinction between groups and collectives. Groups and collectives are both gatherings of individuals, but they are very different social entities.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Free University of BerlinBerlinGermany

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