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Why Implement Without a Tangible Threat? the Effect of a Soft Instrument on National Migrant Integration Policies

  • Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)

Abstract

This chapter shifts the focus to the implementation phase. It bridges the literature on soft law, compliance and policy instruments to examine the determinants of member states’ responses EU soft provisions. Using multilevel regression analysis, it shows that, when member states have no legal obligation to implement, the main driver of compliance with soft law lies with governments’ preferences. These may be constrained by civil society whilst the financial incentives prove incapable of dragging the preferences of member states towards the EU’s.

Keywords

Implementation Public opinion Civil society organisations Policy instruments Open method of coordination Compliance European integration fund Time-series cross-section 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem
    • 1
  1. 1.Fondazione ISMU and University of MilanMilanItaly

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