An Organisational Perspective on Regulatory Capacity Building in the EU

  • Eva Heims
Part of the Executive Politics and Governance book series (EXPOLGOV)


The chapter develops the analytical framework of the book. It suggests that an organisational perspective that is rooted in a bureaucratic politics approach can help us to understand variation in patterns of support of EU agencies’ work on part of national regulators, which previous literature is unable to do. The chapter suggests that national regulators support EU agencies’ work when they perceive this to add value to their core work by helping them to handle key regulatory challenges. Regulatory challenges are conceptualised as institutionally embedded in specific policy sectors and countries. To substantiate this empirically the study focuses on sectors and countries with varying regulatory challenges, namely, drug safety monitoring, maritime safety, food safety and banking regulation in the UK and Germany.


Bureaucratic politics Organisational approach Core mission Regulatory challenges 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eva Heims
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PoliticsUniversity of YorkYorkUK

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