The European Public Prosecutor: Controversy Expressed in Structural Form

  • Marianne L. WadeEmail author


This article highlights the structural differences between the Regulation for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) passed after intense Council negotiation and that initially proposed by the European Commission. It attributes the structural complexity now imposed to concerns about and a significant degree of resistance against the very idea of this revolutionary office. Nevertheless, the EPPO is born. This essay argues that by watering down its potential power structurally, the Member States, however, ultimately failed to recognise that such a revolutionary step—no matter how hampered by inefficient, nationally influenced structures—requires the creation of corresponding accountability structures. It closes highlighting that the failure to ensure political and judicial accountability for such a body raises serious concerns, also likely to feed into some of the broader challenges dogging the EU.


European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) Structures Article 86 TFEU Enhanced cooperation Eurojust EU financial interests Accountability deficits 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Birmingham Law SchoolUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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